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"Give Me a Break!" Emerson on Fruit and Flowers

GARY SHAPIRO

University of Richmond

"Give me a break!" This expression appears to be an imperative or a request.
In colloquial English, it can be either, or it can be uttered with various
degrees of irony as a complaint, an objection, or a reproof. I want to begin by
considering it in a relatively serious way, by asking what it means to ask someone to give, and to give a break. According to some analyses in a certain discourse on the gift (for example, in Nietzsche, Bataille, Levinas, and Derrida),
the gift is always a break of some sort. It is an interruption, an excess, an incalculable intervention. It breaks with a circle or cycle of economic exchange, of
debt and credit. A true gift (to borrow one of Emerson's terms) cannot be one
that was anticipated or one for which return is expected. In one sense, then,
reading very literally, "give me a break" is a tautology, for it says "give me a
gift," where the gift is understood as rupture and disruption. Or perhaps the
break requested is for me, for the speaker of the phrase, who asks for special
consideration; while it may be recognized that there are a set of laws or rules in
place that all are expected to follow, the speaker appeals to his or her special
circumstances, including perhaps a relation to the one addressed. So it can become a demand for justice, for that absolutely unique justice that escapes rule
and law. More specifically, in terms of common usage, the expression is frequently a request for time, for freedom from some constraints or expectations,
possibly a petition to be released from a deadline, or from some constrictive
schedule. It asks for a break in time, a break from or interruption in a rigorous
agenda; it asks for something like an intercalary day, as in the time given at New
Year's in Babylon when there was a festive day that did not appear on the calendar, but that was understood to be available for camivalesque reversals of and
variations on normative social codes. The gift and time-these two themes come
together in recent texts such as Derrida's Given Time (1992), but also in Ralph
Waldo Emerson's essay "Gifts" (see Emerson 1990), which I propose to read.
"Give me a break," then, seems to encapsulate much of what current thought
has to say about the gift. And yet, if we now attend to the phrase as request or
demand, rather than to its presumed object, the break, it begins to seem not
tautologous, but self-contradictory, for surely there is something deeply prob-
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lematic about asking for or demanding a gift. If the gift, including the gift of
time, is something that I have come to expect, to see as my due, then itcannot be
the gift as such, it cannot be a break with the economic norm. At the extreme,
"Give me what you owe me (and you owe me a break)" would seem to involve
a sense of give thathas very little to do with the gift as unmotivated excess. Yet
the usage of the phrase can sometimes encompass this analysis in ironic fash

ion. It asks, speaking fromweariness and frustration,
Why should I have to ask
a
to
it
for
break?
should
be
articulate thatwhich you
my responsibility
you
Why
should have come to by yourself?Why must we now be talking of the gift and
giving, when such talkmust necessarily involve a lapse from the level of the gift
to thatof the conventional economy? The gift cannot be anticipated discursively.
Itmight be saying something to this effect: Ifwhat we are doing, exchanging
services, paying debts, making sure thateverything circulates smoothly, is giv
ing, then I don't want anything. Give me nothing! And yet, giving me nothing,
lettingme off, giving me time just might be the real gift.

Emerson's "Gifts" is a shortessay thatmight seem to be quite innocent of the
sort of analysis towhich I have been alluding. A recent and celebrated intellec
tual biography of Emerson describes it as one of several "light, short pieces"
(Richardson 1995, 400). Yet Emerson placed it in the center of his Essays: Sec
ond Series (1990). Debts toEmerson and to this essay inparticular are acknowl

edged by Nietzsche1 and Marcel Mauss (1990, 65). To the extent thatEmerson
has an image in poststructuralist thought, it is probably not as a radical thinker,
but as an idiosyncratic and eclectic American with a homiletic style and an aver
sion to asking themost penetrating questions; Emerson might be perceived as a
kindly

sage,

revered

for a wisdom

that will

never

cause

great

discomfort.

How

ever, Iwant to suggest thatNietzsche andMauss were right inhonoring Emerson
and that a reading of "Gifts" will confirm the validity of theirdesignating him
as theirpredecessor, forEmerson thinks the break.
Emerson articulates what later appears as a crucial theme in Heidegger,
Bataille, Levinas, and Derrida: the gift, or the true gift, as he calls it, is exces
sive and perhaps transgressive with respect to the law. The gift, I will argue,
emerges as thatwhich marks a rupturewith the law, and this rupture is suffi
cient to displace and unsettle a number of assumptions concerning community,

communication, friendship, and what might be called (in several senses) the
hermeneutics of the present. IfEmerson is not the first inwhom we might find
such a view, we will find itdeveloped in "Gifts," an essay that seems at first to

deal only with the commonplaces ofmanners and etiquette, with what might be
called a remarkable economy. IfEmerson can sound likeMiss Manners when
he writes that "Flowers and fruits are always fitpresents," the insight takes on
another cast when we read it,as we should, against the background of Kantian
aesthetics.

I would

like to begin with the first sentence of "Gifts," which is not strictly
the
speaking
essay's first sentence, for like so many of Emerson's essays this
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one is preceded or framed by one of his poems, and the poem is clearly con
cerned with the gift both as a sign or form of friendship and as the excess that
can signal friendship's end.
Gifts
'T was

of one who

loved me?

When

high time they came;
to love me,
he ceased

Time

they stopped

for shame.

(1990, 303)
The time of the gift is announced here, and questions of time and history will
haunt this essay as will the complex of the gift, love, and the cessation of love.
The poem sounds like a personal statement; it seems to tell a little story, in
which the speaker says thathis gifts from the other, the former friend or lover,
never came quite at the right time, but were too late or too early. How does one
time a gift; how can we be sure that thegift arrives at the rightmoment? Already
in this poem we can see a double reading of "give me a break!" or of the gift as
break. The gift is to be a sheer interruption,an intervention; it is also to be what
is fully and continuously present, which marks a break with sequential, linear
time.

As Emerson will observe later,"The only gift is a portion of thyself," and his
firstexample will be "Therefore thepoet brings his poem." So does the essayist
bring his essay, and "Gifts" is a brief interruption that is placed squarely in the
middle of the second series of essays; it names those essays and itselfwhile
meditating on the very possibility of the gift. Such gifts, "portions," or sacri
fices of the donor, if there are any,would restore society "to the primary basis,
when a man's biography is conveyed in his gift." But the gift that the poet
(Emerson) brings here is one that tells us precisely of the failure of the gift (that
is, the gift given to the speaker) to arrive on time or at the right time.The poem
is a gift thathints at the impossibility of the gift by its story of disappointment

and its elegiac tone.2
What I would like to call the first sentence of the essay, as well as what
follows, seems to referus to other issues about time. Emerson begins, after the
framing poem, by recounting something that is said, but without attributing the
source: "It is said that theworld is in a state of bankruptcy; that theworld owes
theworld more than theworld can pay, and ought to go into chancery and be

sold." We will want to ask who makes this claim that theworld is broke, that it
teeterson the edge of a catastrophic run on thebank. And does Emerson endorse
this?Certainly, it is commonplace in any society thatoperates on credit, and we
can thinkhere of the arguments concerning the state of the debt, the balancing
of the budget, or the futureof social security in any advanced capitalist society
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such as theUnited States. The sentence also conjures up the paradox of the
world being sold at auction, an impossible sale because there are no buyers
outside theworld who might bid on it.Where are the limits of the economy?
What is the law of debt and repayment here? And who might have said such a
thing? Let me suggest thatwe can read this "it is said" as an allusion to the
putative first sentence ofWestern philosophy, a sentence that,by coming at the

beginning, helps to constitute the structurewithin which all thinking about
economy takes place. It is the sentence attributed toAnaximander, which in its
typical translation reads something like this: "Whence things have theirorigin,
there theymust also pass away according to necessity; for theymust pay pen
alty and be judged for their injustice, according to the ordinance of time" (see
1962, 117-18).3 In this usual
Heidegger 1984, 13; see also Kirk and Raven
reading,Anaximander would be expounding a law of universal indebtedness, a
law thatwould be the law of time itself.Everything thatcomes to be would from
the very startowe a debt simply forhaving come intobeing, a debt thatcould be

repaid only by its ceasing to be. To use up time, to linger, to verweilen (or to
while away time) is to exist on credit; however, all debts will eventually fall
due. Nietzsche sees thisprinciple as foundational forWestern philosophy, when

in his essay on Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, he claims that
Schopenhauer, his immediate predecessor, has said essentially the same thing
and attempts to establish that philosophy has said the same thing from
Anaximander to Schopenhauer (1962, 45). While Nietzsche will call this idea
madness in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1985), Emerson will simply leave it as
something that is said, without endorsing or rejecting it.
After

what

I read

as an allusion

to the madness

or,

in any

case,

the beginning

of philosophy, Emerson passes on, in his apparently blithe way, to themost
immediate questions of gift-giving in its everydayness; he reminds us of the
difficultywe might feel, for example, in finding an appropriate gift for the holi
days or to bring home from our travels: "I do not think this general insolvency,
which involves in some sort all the population, to be the reason of the difficulty
experienced at Christmas and New Year and other times in bestowing gifts;
since it is always so pleasant tobe generous, though very vexatious topay debts"
(1990, 305). The question of universal debt is bracketed. Or at least it seems to
be, for if something likeAnaximander's principle obtains, then theworld is not
arranged so as to promote generosity. The point had been made earlier, in "Com
pensation" (see Emerson 1990). The laws of theworld are said always to re
quire thatany natural gift be compensated for by a corresponding defect. After
pages of examples drawn from folk wisdom, observations of the animal king
dom, legend, and literature,Emerson formulates the position rather generally:
"There is a crack in everything God has made. Itwould seem, there is always
this vindictive circumstance stealing in at unawares, even into thewild poesy in
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which thehuman fancy attempted tomake bold holiday, and to shake itself free
of the old laws,?this back-stroke, thiskick of thegun, certifying that the law is
fatal: that in nature nothing can be given, all things are sold" (62). "The law is
fatal." I take that tomean, first,that the law of compensation is fated; there is no
escape from Nemesis and the Furies, as Emerson will say in the next lines.

Second, it is fatal in the sense of death-dealing, for that is the ultimate end to
which these various forms of recompense and retribution tend. Even "wild
has just cited the fates of Prometheus, Achilles, Siegfried,
poesy"?Emerson
and others?must come back to the themes of mortality and punishment when
dealing with heroes and gods whom we thoughtlessly imagine to be beyond
reach of the law. If the gods do not sufferdeath, they can be sentenced to its
closest approximation, eternal punishment.
If this iswhat nature imposes, we may be leftwondering whether individual
gift-giving can be comprehended independently of the general economy. Our

attention is directed to the ordinary, even banal, occasions of giving and the
difficulties they entail.While generosity ought to be pleasant, "the impediment
lies in the choosing," in our own failure to find just the right thing and our
hesitation, indecision, or anguish over that. Indeed, Emerson here writes in the
firstperson, confessing thathe is "puzzled what to give, until the opportunity is
gone." It's not just the gift but the timing of the gift that is crucial. An opportu
nity appears, because of the fatality of the calendar, or for some unusual occa
sion, or because itjust seems like the right thing to do at the time. It is at this
point thatEmerson begins tomuse on various alternatives and offers, it seems,
a bit of advice to the shopper?or is it a meditation informed by Kantian aes
thetics??"Flowers and fruitsare always fitpresents; flowers, because they are
a proud assertion that a ray of beauty outvalues all the values of theworld . . .
they are like music out of a workhouse" (1990, 305). Kant was fond of the
flower as an exemplar of natural beauty; we also know, as did Emerson, thathe
was outraged by the song that issued from the local workhouse and thathe wrote

letters to put an end to it.Emerson's taste ismore tolerant; he finds the idea of
music coming from a workhouse to illustrate something verymuch likeKant's
conception of beauty as emerging from a world of necessity while remaining
enigmatically consistent with it.
In theCritique of Judgment,Kant's lists of things thatwe find beautiful in
variably begin with flowers. There are at least seven such lists of objects that
least some that
please us without our having to ask for anything.4Flowers?at
we are expected to call tomind?are
incontestable examples of natural beauty.
Thus, theygive a rhetorical weight to these lists,which sometimes move from
the natural to the artistic, including landscape gardening and carpets with ara
besque patterns; note thatmany of these are variations on floral patterns. (It
in
might be interesting to know something about the state of horticulture
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there such??as
K?nigsberg, and whether Kant ever saw any wildflowers?are
to
of
The
flower
at
illustrations
is
the
head of the list
them.)
opposed
always
because it ismeaningless; it breaks with sense. As Kant says, "Flowers, free
designs, lines aimlessly intertwined and called foliage: these have no signifi
cance, depend on no determinate concept, and yet we like them" (Kant A 207;
1987,49). Flowers are fitgifts because they are already natural gifts; insofar as
they transcendmere law, they are excessive and supplementary, therebymark
ing a break with what would otherwise be the uninterrupted reign of mecha
nism.What we want in a gift,both as givers and as receivers, is a break from the
law, so what better gift than thatwhich is already a break? Always at the begin

ning of theKantian list, the flower is thatuncanny thing that suggests meaning
while denying it.For a flower to be beautiful, itmust be singular and itmust be
given. To explain why "All tulips are beautiful" is not to give a judgment of
taste;Kant contrasts itwith another judgment "by which I find a singular given

(gegebene) tulip beautiful" (A 285; 1987, 148). Should we hear the es gibt in
this gegebene! Is itonly the singular, thatwhich exceeds or teeterson the verge
of sense, that can be given?
Flowers also mark a break, as Kant emphasizes, with significance. We find
thembeautiful only upon reflection, independentlyof any given concept. Emerson
notes the departure from natural law when he writes, "Nature does not cocker
us; we are children, not pets; she is not fond; everything is dealt to us without
fear or favor, after severe universal laws. Yet these delicate flowers look like the

frolic and interferenceof love and beauty" (1990, 305). "Nature does not cocker
us": we are not pampered spaniels. Nevertheless we sometimes have experi
ences thatgive the appearance of "the frolic and interferenceof love and
beauty";
and thismay be one of the senses of the longing thatcan be expressed by "give
me a break!" which begs for "interference" and
interruption.At least this is
what we want in a truegift,a term thatEmerson will introduce later to designate
the gift as such, as opposed to the profane or banal gift that answers merely to
necessity or,worse, toprevailing social expectations. I read "frolic" as Emerson's
version of Kant's "free play," with a bit of joy or Lust added in thatmight have
caught Nietzsche's attention. Elsewhere (in the essay "Politics") Emerson de
scribes the presence of thewise man as a present of flowers: "His relation to
men is angelic; his memory ismyrrh to them; his presence, frankincense and
flowers" (338). As angelic, he is a message without a meaning, and so we can
rejoice and frolic in and with him.
What would theworld be likewithout a break from nature's "severe univer
sal laws"? Itwould be a place, as Kant tells us, where therewas no difference
between human action and feeling and thecoldest mechanism. Kant's first
quali
fication to this picture of theworld is, of course, his idea that our moral au
tonomy helps us escape from these external strictures; yet themoral law im
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poses an imperative that is even more powerful because it is our own and comes
from the depths of our being. That there should be natural gifts, that is, such
things as beauty and sublimity is both a wonder in itself and a sign that the two
realms of law are not simply opposed to one another.Yet when it comes to the
question of thegifts thatwe give and receive among ourselves, Emerson seems
to think thathere, too, there are traces of themoral law that render the activity

problematic. I take him to be following Kant in suggesting that the existence of
themoral law is not a sufficient counterweight, for he says thatwe need some
relief from "the law of benefits," the law thatmakes giving and receiving diffi
cult. A preliminary statement of that law is "The law of benefits is a difficult
channel, which requires careful sailing, or rude boats. It is not the office of a
man to receive gifts.How dare you give them?We wish to be self-sustained.We
do not quite forgive a giver. The hand that feeds us is in some danger of being
bitten" (306). My autonomy seems to require that I be "self-sustained"; so Iwill
tend to be suspicious of gifts, that is, of services or favors that are not required
by themoral law. If they come from nature, like flowers, or from art, which
offers its simulacra of the floral to everyone, I can muse upon them as the sym
bols of a deeper unity in things than is evident from the two domains of theoreti
cal

and

practical

reason.

Flowers might be exemplary, then,not only because they are nature's origi
nal gift, an excess in relation to her (always "her") laws, but also because they
suggest a certain way inwhich a recipient can understand himself or herself, a
kind of "careful sailing" through thatchannel of the law of benefits. If you give
me flowers, you may remindme of the gift that is given to all of us, rather than
forcingme to think of your motive in choosing this or that object and to ask
myself what you want of me. It is not that such concerns will necessarily be
totally absent in the case of the gift of flowers; but thispresent offers one possi
bility of our engaging in an activity of exchange that, like all exchange, must
come under the authority of themoral law, and our sometimes jealous concern
forour own autonomy, as if itwere really in thedomain of the aesthetic. At least
that iswhat I take Emerson to be hinting in this passage that speaks of the hints
of nature: "Men use to tell us thatwe love flatteryeven thoughwe are not de
ceived by it,because it shows thatwe are importantenough tobe courted. Some
thing like thatpleasure the flowers give us: what am I towhom these sweet hints
are addressed?" (305). There is in the case of flowers a possibility of evading

the calculation that always threatens to subordinate the gift to an economy of
exchange. As natural gift, flowers are already given and so are eminently givable.
Insofar as we are addressed by them, they flatter us without deceiving, or, as
Kant said, they exhibit purposiveness without purpose. They are "sweet hints,"
aspects of a flirtation that seems to be going on between us and nature. The one
who gives us flowers may indeed be courting us, but it is also possible thatwe
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will be provoked towonder about themuch largerquestion of why nature courts
us. We know that flowers are the product of "severe universal laws," yet they
flatterus by suggesting thatwe have a higher destination thanmerely enacting
those laws ourselves. We (should we read this as "we men"?) are "important
enough to be courted" (could thismean thateven we men are courtable, as if it
went without saying thatwomen are?). As Emerson later begins to spell out the
difficulties of the "law of benefits," one of themajor problems is thatof address.
Imay feel as ifa gift fails to take account of who I am; or Imay recoil by being
given something that shows that the sender has readme all toowell. Gift-giving
risks undermining themasks thatare necessary for our self-protection. The gift
of flowers raises a question: "What am I to whom these sweet hints are ad
dressed?" The gift is a break that puts us into question; when flowers are ad

dressed tome, I ask not just who I am, but what I am. Who is relevant in the
calculating law of benefits.What does itmean to receive a gift of rollerblading
equipment or JudithKrantz's latest novel or handcuffs or a Mont Blanc pen?
This question initiates a hermeneutics of the gift:What could he or she have
been thinkingof? Am I known not at all or all toowell? Who am I thatyou have
characterized by your gift?What am I, such that I can appreciate the excessive,

supplementary beauty of the flower? The recipient of this gift is a being for
whom itsbeing is a question, a question that ideally should take us beyond the
more mundane casuistry of the law of benefits.
Fruits are treated as slightly less exemplary of the gift than flowers: "Fruits
are acceptable gifts, because they are the flower of commodities, and admit of

fantastic values being attached to them" (Emerson 1990, 305). They are "ac
ceptable," I take it, in a double sense: there is nothing objectionable about giv
ing them (as there is about jewelry, for example) and they are worthy of accep
tance by theone towhom theyare given. The second sense is perhaps the root of
the first,for only thatwhich I can accept without reservations can be an accept
able present for you to give. As a commodity, fruit is useful, it can satisfy that
most primitive desire of hunger.And yet itexhibits those colors, shapes, tastes,
and textures in their natural state (or in the cultivated state we call natural in
distinction tomore mechanical modes of production) thatmake them appeal to
the senses. (Ifwe were to follow the dialogue with Kant here more closely, we
would have to interrogatehis traditionaldistinction between the theoretical senses
and others thatwould exclude even the fragrance of flowers from the aesthetic
realm.)We might thinkof the European still life, especially those great Dutch

paintings of the seventeenth century thatglory in the spectacle of radiant fruit,
with theirpartially peeled lemons. So farEmerson continues towork within the
frameworkof a generalized Kantian aesthetics. The gift is thebeautiful: unsought,
purely emergent, and adventitious with respect to all necessities. But, as with
Kant, especially theKant who emerges in Jean-Frangois Lyotard's reading, these
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gifts of flowers and fruitare to be seen as provocations, as breaks, events, or
phrases thatcall for furtherphrases from us?not counter-gifts,but explorations
of what we are (Lyotard 1994).
What Emerson does not say specifically about flowers and fruit is that they
are ephemeral gifts; theywill last only a few days. Flowers and fruitare present,
presents that remind us of the vanishing quality of the present. They celebrate
the time of blossoming, flourishing, and ripeness. They are a gift of time pre
cisely because they evoke an awareness of theirown brevity. Thus, the flower
especially becomes a privileged poetic figure because it ties togetherbeauty, the

gift, temporality,and hints ofmortality. And just because of their fleeting char
acter, flowers and fruithave an advantage over more lasting gifts, such as those
of jewels and precious metals, which Emerson will soon discuss. Since they
disappear naturally, the recipient has no responsibility to preserve them past
theirwilting or overripeness; the recipient cannot be expected to display them

indefinitely or to pass them on to another.While it is possible to keep pressed
flowers, there is also the sense that there is something excessive about thisprac
tice. Flowers are not like those hideous presents from your relatives that you
must store away in the attic and bring out, dust off, and put up on the shelfwhen
they come to visit. The other side to the transitorycharacter of flowers and fruit
is that theymust be cut, picked, or plucked; like theirpainted counterparts in
still lifes, they are not presented in theirpresumed natural state.They are given
as broken, theirgiving ismarked by a break; they can be present only in their
enforced

transience.

Emerson distinguishes fruitand flowers from "common gifts." The latterare
not to be despised; they are least taxing when they indeed answer to a specific
lack: "For common gifts, necessity makes pertinences and beauty every day,
and one is glad when an imperative leaves him no option; since if theman at the
door have no shoes, you have not to consider whether you could procure him a
paint-box" (1990, 305). Here we are in the realm of the ethical. The other stands
before us in need and an "imperative" dictates thatwe fill thatneed. Posing the
alternative as shoes versus a paint-box deftly emphasizes the contrast between
two kinds of gifts, the utilitarian and the aesthetic. Here "Necessity does every
thingwell," the necessity that flows from the ethical imperative, an imperative
thatgoes beyond Kant in a Levinasian direction: "In our condition of universal
dependence it seems heroic to let thepetitioner be the judge of his necessity, and
to give all that is asked, though at great inconvenience. If itbe a fantastic desire,

it is better to leave to others the office of punishing him" (306). To be in the
position of receiving is once more marked as dangerous. "Common gifts," then,
are not truegifts, insofar as they respond to a specifically ethical imperative and
may put the recipient at risk.
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Is any gift other than flowers and fruitpossible? (And let us not forget that
even thesemust be given in a certain spirit.)Again, Emerson provisionally in
troduces a rule or principle by attributing it to another: "Next to things of neces

sity, the rule for a gift,which one of my friends prescribed, is thatwe might
convey to some person thatwhich properly belonged to his character, and was
easily associated with him in thought" (306). This is, perhaps, the norm, the
goal we have inmind when we prowl through themall or the department store.

But it is also the situation arousing that abyss of indecision thatEmerson had
begun by evoking: "The impediment lies in the choosing." What will she really
thinkof this scarf? Is it too tame, too flashy, too expensive? Is a book too imper
sonal? Sometimes we arrive at the right thing by some inspiration. But it's at
thispoint thatwe may be tempted to fall back upon the lowest common denomi

nator: jewelry, thatwhich might seem to be rather like flowers, insofar as it
appears destined to be a gift.What else can itbe for,other thanpresentation and

display?
Like flowers, gold seems to be self-giving; it radiates. But Emerson rejects
such an account of the general suitability of precious metals or jewels:
tokens of compliment
and love are for the most
are not gifts, but apologies
for gifts
jewels

[0]ur

and other

part barbarous.
...
it is a cold

Rings
lifeless

you go to the shops to buy me something which does not repre
life and talents, but a goldsmith's.
This is fit for kings, and rich men
represent kings, and a false state of property, to make
presents of gold

business

when

sent your
who
and

silver

mail. (306)

stuffs, as a kind of symbolical

sin-offering,

or payment

of black

In rejecting conventional gifts of "gold and silver stuffs,"Emerson formulates
theprinciple cited earlier: "The only gift is a portion of thyself.Thou must bleed
forme" (306). And this bleeding contrasts with the "symbolical sin-offering"

constituted by the jewels bestowed by the rich.5There is a disjunction between
theorganic and the inorganic, one thatwas heralded by the introductionof flow
ers and fruit.The theme of bodily sacrifice emerges, the idea that a "true
gift"
would be the result of a wound, a sacrifice of love. And by the end of the essay,
we will apparently be told thatgifts are possible
only through love. But what
has happened, then, to the rule prescribed by the unknown friend, according to
which the giftmust match the recipient? Does thismean that the giftmust show
that there is an attunement, an affinity,a merger between what is
given and the
recipient?in other words, that there is no break between them? Let us call the
suggestion thatone must give something authentically one's own thebiographi
cal principle. This principle in turn can be seen as one constituent of a natural
economy, which Emerson describes in thisway :
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the shepherd, his lamb; the farmer, corn; theminer,
[T]he poet brings his poem;
a gem; the sailor, coral and shells; the painter, his picture;
the girl, a handker
chief of her own sewing. This is right and pleasing,
for it restores society in so
far to the primary

basis,

when

a man's

biography

is conveyed

everyman's wealth is an indexof his merit. (1990, 306)

in his gift, and

In this sense, Emerson, thepoet and essayist, offers gifts bymeans of "Gifts."
Or is it too easy to give of oneself in this sense? Shouldn't the genuine gift be
one that,as the friend suggests, is appropriate for the recipient? Is the "primary
basis" sketched here perhaps not so much a context for the gift, the excessive,
supplementary gift, as it is the outline of an economy of exchange, an aesthetic
socialism of the sort thatattracted somany nineteenth-century thinkers, inwhich
therewould be a seamless and spontaneous system of productivity and circula

tion? Ideally, giving of oneself would coincide with giving theotherwhat is best
forher or what pleases her. From each according toher ability to each according
to her desire. James Joyce, during the period of his own aesthetic socialism,
writes toNora Barnacle of the necklace he's had made for her; there is an in
scribed pendant thatreads on one side "Love is unhappy" and on theother "When
It is a line from one of his poems, so he combines
love is away" (1975,167-68).
the poet's artwith the giving of gold or silver.As Emerson defines the truegift,
"The gift, to be true,must be the flowing of thegiver untome, correspondent to

my flowing unto him" (1990, 307). This flowing, this correspondence would
seem to eliminate any gap or discontinuity. To give a break would then be to
efface or eliminate any break. Does this risk reducing the gift to an economy of
presence, as Derrida suggests ofHeidegger's meditation onAnaximander (1994,
27)? Or does Emerson's appeal to a natural, archaic economy function ironi
cally in order to suggest the impossibility of the gift, given themythical and
idealized character of the archaic? We might think of this flowing and corre

sponding in connection with the bleeding already invoked when Emerson says
to thegiver, "Thou must bleed forme." Flowing and corresponding would elimi
nate all breaks; what's yours ismine, and the examples of flagons of oil or other
liquids towhich Emerson appeals are significant insofar as they come from the
realm of thatwhich does not come in discretely measured units, but which can
be poured out and distributed continuously. However, to bleed for another is to
suffera wound or a break. It is even said that those who share the same blood,
themembers of a family, cannot strictlygive to one another because they are

already one in some sense. Furthermore, there ismuch anthropological testi
mony thatgift exchange is often seen as the literal ormetaphorical transmission
of bodily fluids; we might wonder what happens to the idea of the gift in a
culture that sets itself the goal of prohibiting or radically restricting such trans
mission.
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"Gifts," then,can be read as a meditation on the impossibility of the gift. It's
all downhill from fruitand flowers.Mauss observes in his citation of Emerson
that "[t]he unreciprocated gift stillmakes the person who has accepted it infe
are still in the field ofGermanic morality when we recall the curious
rior_We
Emerson
entitled 'Gifts'" (1990, 65). Nietzsche excavates thatworld
essay by

of Germanic morality inOn theGenealogy ofMorals (1989), where debt and
credit rule and there are terriblepenalties for refusing to pay.Was it thatworld
of Germanic morality thatHeidegger was attempting to erase with all of his
readings of es gibt! The structureof Emerson's essay might indicate this.After
allowing for the possibility of gifts of fruitand flowers, Emerson proceeds, as
we have seen, to evoke the idea of a primary economy; however, he does this

only to contrast itwith the actual world inwhich false gifts of gold and silver
misrepresent both giver and recipient. He continues by exploring the difficulty
of receiving in a passage already quoted, where he says that"[i]t is not theoffice
of a man

to receive

gifts."

Emerson sometimes appears to be a cheery sage, a Taoist touched by classi
cal American optimism. When he writes "He is a good man who can receive a
it
giftwell," we may be tempted to suppose that there are such good men?and
is overwhelmingly "men" not "women" or even "people" that appear in this
thatwe could be among them. But the sentences that follow make
essay?and
this reading very doubtful:

are either glad or sorry at a gift, and both emotions
are unbecoming.
Some
or
I think is done, some degradation
I
when
borne,
rejoice
grieve at a
is invaded, or when a gift comes from
gift. I am sorry when my independence

We

violence

such as do not know my spirit, and so the act is not supported;
and if the gift
me
I
then
should
that
should
be
ashamed
the
donor
read my
overmuch,
pleases
heart, and

see that I love his commodity,

and not him.

(307)

So it is not only the donor who must have no expectations with regard to the
gift,who must withdraw from all hopes and anticipations of effects and return;
the recipient is in an equally difficult situation, forwhat was supposed to be a
break with the usual economy renders him more vulnerable than before. Now
the recipient must guard against his heart being read. "Give me a break" can
sometimes mean "don't give me any gifts." Give me a break from the cycle of
expectations; give me some time; letme be the one to offer,provoke, tease, or
change the rules of the game.
You cannot give me anything from friendship,Emerson says, because friends
have everything in common: "How can you give me thispot of oil or this flagon

of wine when all your oil and wine ismine, which belief ofmine this gift seems
to deny?" (307). To think of it as a gift is to bring into question a relation in
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which we are gifts for one another. "This giving is flat usurpation," Emerson
remarks, noting its turn into its apparent opposite.
In the last two paragraphs of "Gifts," Emerson sums up the analyses thatwe
have been following. He writes: "The reason of these discords I conceive to be

that there is no commensurability between a man and any gift" (307). The law
of thegift, then, is discord and incommensurability. And yet, if therewere a gift
that did not involve discord and incommensurability, would it be a true gift!
Without such breaks, the giftwould seem to amount to giving what is due, not
with the supplementary and excessive. Emerson seems to say as much when he

concludes the penultimate paragraph by suggesting thathis critique of the gift
so far applies only to planned, deliberate, calculative giving, a giving thatmust
be undermined by the failure of all commensurability.We can at best give indi
rectly,perhaps unconsciously, by what he calls an "oblique" stroke: "[W]e sel
dom have the satisfaction of yielding a direct benefit which is directly received.

But rectitude scatters favors on every side without knowing it,and receives with
wonder the thanks of all people" (308). While Emerson at firstcalls this possi
bility or condition of the gift rectitude, a word that sounds odd here, as if there
were some right standard tomeet, his last paragraph calls the gift-giving virtue
"themajesty of love, which is the genius and god of gifts, and towhom we must
not affect to prescribe." How are we to understand love here? Let us read the
concluding lines of "Gifts" inwhich, not so surprisingly, love and its absence
are described in termsof how theydeal with flowers and fruit.Speaking of love,
he writes:

from
of flowerleaves
him give kingdoms
indifferently. There are persons
is
we always expect fairy-tokens;
to expect them. This
let us not cease
rules. For the rest I like to
and not to be limited by our municipal
prerogative,

Let

whom

see that we

cannot be bought and sold. The best of hospitality
and of generos
to you; you do
ity is also not in the will, but in fate. I find that I am not much
not need me; you do not feel me;
then am I thrust out of doors,
though you
me house and lands. No services are of any value, but only likeness.
proffer

When I have attemptedtojoinmyself toothersby services, itproved an intel
lectual

trick?no

more.

They

eat your

service

like apples,

and

leave

you out.

But love them,and theyfeel you and delight inyou all the time. (308)

It seems thatEmerson has retracted everything he has said earlier; the gift is
made possible through love. If love obtains, then "kingdoms of flowerleaves"
may be given indifferently; they are "fairy-tokens" because of theirmagical,
ephemeral beauty, giving time and marking its breaks. Deliberate, calculated
gifts are, like apples, devoured without thought of the giver. Love gives fruit
and flowers as true gifts. It gives a break, but a break that is the effacement of
any break. Love gives a break that is also a seamless, infinitewhole. It offers an
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endless "present," in the double sense of a gift and of a release from time, a
break in time. The heightened language of this passage, inwhich love is per
sonified as a god and his gifts are "fairy-tokens," suggests the fantastic dimen
sion of all of this, theway inwhich the "present" in all of its senses is imaginary
(if not impossible). If thinking thegift is in some sense thinking the impossible,

that is marked by the way in which it leads us to think another form of the
impossible, love. The essay "Love" begins by distinguishing actual and ideal
love. If we want to "attain to that inward view of the law" of love "the first
condition is, thatwe must leave a too close and lingering adherence to facts, and
study the sentiment as itappeared in hope and not in history. For each man sees
his own lifedefaced and disfigured, as the lifeofman is not, inhis imagination"

(98). If all things are possible with love, they are so only through the idealized
love that is understood to surpass all of our experience. Emerson describes the
memory of our loves as ineluctably painful:

[E]achman sees his own lifedefaced and disfigured,as the lifeofman is not,

a certain stain of
Each man sees over his own experience
imagination.
that of other men
looks fair and ideal. Let any man go back to
error, whilst
to his

thosedelicious relationswhich make thebeauty of his life,which have given
instruction and nourishment,
he will shrink and moan....
Every
seen
is
beautiful
from
the
of
the
intellect, or as truth. But all is sour,
thing
point
if seen as experience.
(98)

him sincerest

In "Gifts," true gifts are shown to be impossible, unless they are given out of
love. But a reading of the earlier essay "Love" demonstrates a difference be
tween true love and our experiences of love that is analogous to that between
true gifts and those sorry substitutes for them thatmake us uneasy at the holi
days. Here it seems that thePlatonic and Neoplatonic strain inEmerson's thought
is at work in order to cast doubt on the value of the ordinary; themore glowing

his description of the universal love of imagination becomes, themore limited
and impotent the love of our experience and memory appears.
This Platonizing tendencymanifests itself in another floral discourse, one in
which flowers again hint of another world. In "Gifts," they intimate the possi
bility of a genuine gift; in this context, they suggest thepossibility of a true love
(perhaps another form of natural gift):
The

ancients

called

less charm which

beauty
glances

can analyze
the flowering of virtue. Who
the name
from one and another face and form? ... It is de

Nor does
stroyed for the imagination
by any attempt to refer it to organization.
it point to any relations of friendship or love known and described
in society,
but, as it seems tome, to a quite other and unattainable
sphere, to relations of
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transcendent

show. (102)

delicacy

and

sweetness,

to what

roses

and violets

hint and fore

Here a Kantian conception of the beauty of flowers is wedded to a Platonic
notion of love as the quest for beauty itself.Yet if "the ancients" spoke of "the
flowering of virtue," they did not dwell, as do Kant and Emerson, on flowers
themselves (indeed, at the analogous point in Socrates' discourse on love in the

Symposium, he turns to discuss the beautiful faces and bodies of young men,
something thatmight have been difficult forEmerson to speak of explicitly). It
seems that the gift is not possible in the ordinary course of things; if there is to
be a gift, itwill arise from love. Yet love as we know it is a pale shadow of the
true love thatwould make gifts possible. Without that love, we have flowers to
remind us of its absence.

Notes
"Gifts" in The Gay Science when he writes, "Frankin
paraphrases Emerson's
says 'Do not flatter your benefactors.' Repeat this saying in a Christian church;
right away it clears the air of everything Christian" (1974, ?142).
2. Commenting on Mauss, Derrida asks, "Why must one begin with a poem when one speaks
of the gift? And why does the gift always appear to be the gift of the poem, the don du poeme as
1. Nietzsche

cense.?Buddha

Mallarme

says?" (1992, 40).
3. Nietzsche, at least in some writings, distances himself from the idea thatwe must always be
paying our debts, that theworld owes more than it can pay. He not only suspends itby means of the
that it ismadness
that
"it is said," but also has Zarathustra say in the chapter "Of Redemption"
preaches such things. I am tempted to say thathe attributes thismadness to theWestern philosophi

to Schopenhauer. And Heidegger, who takes issue with Nietzsche's
translation of Anaximander's
saying, does so in order to open up a possibility for thinking that the
tradition has been cast into oblivion. In Specters ofMarx
(1994), Derrida suggests, in effect, that
is a revision of the revenge tragedy, a rewriting according to which there is some
just as Hamlet

cal tradition fromAnaximander

reinscription of the
thing other than a simple cycle of injury, debt, and vengeance, so Heidegger's
Anaximander
saying is an attempt to read the history of thought as something other than a revenge
tragedy, a story of how whatever emerges must perish in order to pay a debt. Hamlet, Heidegger,
and Emerson are all concerned with the ontology of the gift; they ask, in one of Derrida's formula

tions, "How does the concern with what there is to be intersect, in order perhaps to exceed it,with
the logic of vengeance or right?" (1994, 23). The questions posed by Heidegger and Derrida might
be paraphrased as, "Can we get a break from the cycle of debt and revenge?"
edition of Kant's works, pp. 207, 282, 291, 299, 323, 347, 349; the
4. See the Akadamie
Akademie pagination is given in Pluhar's translation of Critique of Judgment (1987), which I have
followed.
In Thus Spoke
and Bataille.
5. Here Emerson's
thought stands in contrast with Nietzsche
Zarathustra, Zarathustra, upon receiving a staffwith a golden handle, praises gold as symbolic of
all gift-giving (see Nietzsche
1985, part 1, "On theGift- Giving Virtue"). Bataille finds jewelry to
be excessive and wasteful in a fashion thatmakes it an exemplary gift (1985, 119).
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